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Abstract
This paper investigates the response in prices to demand changes over the seasonal cycle in the
Swedish retail gasoline market. In contrast to what has been found for the gasoline market in the
United States, we find no support for seasonal price changes compatible with the theories for
cyclical variations of intensity of competition. We also study the response in prices to the demand
fluctuations induced by tax increases, but neither do they support the theory. Some possible
explanations for this difference between the gasoline markets Sweden and the United States are
discussed.
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A large theoretical and empirical literature has studied the relationship between
cyclical demand and prices or margins. The focus of the literature is on the possible link
between cyclical pricing and the business cycle. Prices will tend to be counter-cyclical if
increasing volumes have a reducing effect on prices. This will then magnify fluctuations in
output. Several theoretical motivations for cyclical changes in prices have been put
forward. For an overview of the theories see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). One family
of models has studied the relation between cyclical demand changes and the intensity of
competition. Tacit collusion is often modeled as the outcome of a game where agents
balance the gains from deviating from the collusive price, thereby gaining a short run
profit, against the gains from maintaining collusion in future periods. If demand fluctuates,
the gain from deviating is high in periods of high demand. Collusion may still be
sustainable if the collusive price is allowed to vary with demand. A lower price in high
demand states reduces the gains from deviating, since it reduces the gain from each unit
sold in these states. This gives rise to a cyclical price pattern over the business or seasonal
cycle. The first paper that formally models this idea is Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).
They provide a model of collusion over varying demand states, which predicts that an
increase in current demand over future demand will have a negative effect on prices. The
demand states are assumed to be identically and independently distributed over time,
making expected future demand equal in all periods. A realization of an unusually high
demand state makes it more profitable to deviate, given the price of the competitors, since
current demand is higher than normal, but expected future demand remains unchanged.
Hence, in order to equalize the profit from deviating and the profit from sticking to the
implicit agreement, the price must move in the opposite direction to demand. 
Other papers have employed Rotemberg and Saloner’s basic idea, but with different
assumptions for the evolution of demand. Kandori (1991) assumes changes in demand to
be serially correlated. Bagwell and Staiger (1997), assume that demand vary randomly
between fast and slow growth phases. Demand for gasoline in Sweden follows a similar
seasonal pattern for all years in the period studied. This is not consistent with the
assumptions in the models above. Haltiwanger and Harrington provide a model for a
deterministic demand cycle, which is more appropriate for the Swedish gasoline market.2
Their model is quite different from that of Rotemberg and Saloner, but both models build
on the idea that the collusive price depends on the relation between current and future
demand. Demand is assumed to rise in each period until reaching the peak level, then it
falls in each period until it reaches the lowest level of demand. This is the only restriction
Haltiwanger and Harrington impose on the demand cycle; there are no other restrictions on
the speed or duration of the changes in demand over the cycle. The model gives different
predictions for different discount factors. Firms will collude at the monopoly price level in
all periods if the discount factor is sufficiently high and price at the marginal cost level in
all periods if the discount factor is sufficiently low. The most interesting analysis is in
intermediate case. Firms will then collude, but the sustainable collusive price will vary
over the cycle, with prices below the monopoly price in at least one period and above the
marginal cost in at least one period.
Haltiwanger and Harrington’s model provide two testable predictions. Controlling
for the level of demand, prices will be higher when demand is increasing than when it is
decreasing. The second prediction is that. If the discount factor is high enough, so that
prices exceed marginal costs, profits will weakly lead the cycle. The Swedish gasoline
retail market is well suited for testing the theory, since variations in demand follow a
deterministic seasonal cycle over the year. Although this paper only tests one specific
model for a seasonal cycle, it can also be viewed as a test of the more general idea that
changes in demand may affect the intensity of competition. In this way, the test is also
relevant for the question of pricing over the business cycle.
Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) have found support for Haltiwanger and
Harrington’s model for business cycle variations for the Portland cement1 industry in the
United States. A study of particular interest for this paper is Borenstein and Shepard
(1996). They study the response in prices to seasonal demand changes in the United States,
i. e. the same issue as we study for Sweden. They find support for the theory of
Haltiwanger and Harrington. Volumes lead margins. The margin is higher in periods when
demand is expected to increase than when it is expected to decrease, for periods with
approximately the same demand. 
There is a relatively large literature studying price setting on the gasoline market.
The results from these studies can be used to control for variables other than changes in
demand that affect the pricing decision. The short-run price dynamics of the Swedish
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gasoline retail market has been studied by Asplund, Eriksson and Friberg (2000). The main
results were that cost changes were gradually passed through and that the price adjustment
to cost increases and cost decreases was asymmetric in the short run, but symmetric in the
long run. Similar results have been found for British data, see Bacon (1991), and for
American data, see Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997).
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. In
section 3, we estimate the response in prices to seasonal demand changes. In section 4, we
discuss the price response to demand fluctuations induced by large tax increases. Section 5
concludes by discussing possible explanations for the differences in results for the Swedish
and the American gasoline market.
2 Data description
We study the seasonal pattern of margins for the Swedish gasoline chains for the
period 1980-1996.2 Demand for gasoline increases in the spring, peaks in the summer,
declines in the fall and passes a trough in the winter. Sales are, on average, 42% higher in
July than in January. The seven largest firms have a total market share of 95%, but no
single firm has a market share exceeding 25%. The total value of gasoline sales is about
3% of GDP in Sweden. Taxes account for a large fraction of the price of gasoline. During
the period studied taxes constitute on average about 55% of the retail price of gasoline,
varying from 40% to 71%.
The gasoline price is the VAT-excluded list price for premium leaded gasoline. The
price is usually the same for all firms, and a large dispersion among firms in prices is very
uncommon. We use the price for one of the firms, Shell, referred to as the firm below. The
results are not sensitive to what firm is chosen. Gasoline is, at least physically, a relatively
undifferentiated good. Consumers have a low inventory capacity, which puts a limit on the
extent to which sales can increase when the price is unusually low, e. g. before a tax
increase or during a price war. 
The chain between the international spot market price and the retail price is simpler
in Sweden than in the United States. In Sweden, the retail price is directly linked to the
Rotterdam spot market price. Some firms buy gasoline at the Rotterdam spot market,
whereas firms with their own gasoline production use the Rotterdam spot price as the
                                                          
2 Halitiwanger and Harington assume constant marginal costs. As taxes and world market prices for gasoline vary,
we look at the margin instead of prices, where margin is defined as retail price minus taxes and world market price.4
transfer price. Firms either own the gasoline retail stations or set the price for their
franchisees. The chain between the international market and the gasoline retail market
consists of several links in the United States. Cost changes are gradually passed through
from the international to the regional and local markets and hence, expected marginal cost
changes must be included in the estimation of the margin in the United States. The market
structure in are also different in that a large fraction of gasoline sales is unbranded and sold
by independent retailers in the United States.
The margin, MARGIN, is defined as the retail price, RP, minus the per liter tax,
TAX, and the cost for buying gasoline at the Rotterdam spot market, MC. MARGIN is
measured in SEK*100, not as the percent mark-up. The Rotterdam gasoline price is
denoted in USD, and is multiplied by the SEK/USD exchange rate in order to obtain MC in
SEK*100. The retail price, RP, the Rotterdam gasoline price and the SEK/USD exchange
rate are available on a daily basis. MONTHVOL and YEARVOL are the monthly and yearly
volumes sold in Sweden. We use price and cost data as of the fifteenth day of each month
in the regressions, since we only have access to monthly data on quantities. Table 1 shows
the descriptive statistics for the variables.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
MARGIN, MC, TAX and RP are measured in nominal SEK*100 and MONTHVOL
and YEARVOL in 1000 m
3. TAX and sold volumes are reported in the annual reports from
the Swedish Petroleum Institute. Platt’s, a firm collecting prices in the oil market, is the
source for MC. There is a positive trend in MARGIN, TAX and RP for the period studied,
which is expected since these variables are nominal, but there is no trend in MC due to
falling real prices on oil. The variance in YEARVOL is rather low with the highest value
being only 26 percent higher than the lowest value. The highest yearly volumes are from
the end of the eighties. Most of the variation in MONTHVOL is explained by seasonal
variation. There is no systematic seasonal variation in the use of rebates, but there is some
seasonal variation in transportation costs to the northern parts of Sweden, which is not
accounted for in the measure of MC. According to the firm, this variation is not passed
through to the prices and hence not to MARGIN. These cost changes is below 1 SEK*100.
The results in the next section are not sensitive to this measurement error and remain
almost unchanged if MARGIN is decreased by 1 SEK*100 during the winter months.5
[DIAGRAM 1 ABOUT HERE]
Diagram 1 shows the development of average normalized3 margin and average
normalized  MONTHVOL. Both MONTHVOL  and profits (measured as
MARGIN*MONTHVOL) peak in July, which is consistent with Haltiwanger and
Harrington’s prediction that profits weakly lead demand. However, the prediction that, for
a given demand, prices should be higher, when demand is expected to increase finds no
support in the diagram. If anything, the opposite seems to be the case. The development of
normalized margin is quite different from Borenstein and Shepard’s data for the gasoline
market in the United States. The most important difference seen in the diagram is that, for
a given level of demand, normalized margin tends to be high when demand is expected to
increase. Demand in, for example, May and September is approximately of the same
magnitude, but the margin is much lower in May. For the United States the opposite is the
case. 
3 Econometric Analysis
Already by looking at Diagram 1, one may suspect that it will be hard to find support for
Haltiwanger and Harrington’s model in the data. In this section we will present the results
from some econometric specifications which formally test the theory. None of them
support the theory, however. 
The reported regressions follow Borenstein and Shepard’s approach as closely as
possible in order to facilitate comparisons with their results for the gasoline market in the
United States. Alternative specifications have also been estimated, and the results for these
specifications are very much in line with those reported.
RP,  MC and TAX are cointegrated. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be
rejected at the 10 percent level for any of the variables. A Johansen cointegration test
including a constant and a linear trend rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the
5 percent level.4
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4 The inclusion of a linear trend in the cointegrating relationship is supported by the Akaike information criterion.6
The cointegrating relationship:
RP= α + β1TIME +β2MC + β3TAX (1)
We specify an error correction model in which deviations from the cointegration
relationship as well as a number of variables important for the short run dynamics are
included. For the short run dynamics, we distinguish between positive and negative
changes in MC, since the response in prices in previous studies of gasoline has often been
shown to be asymmetric. The last four variables are the error correction term. The constant
in the cointegrating relationship is implicitly included in α.
RP – RP-1 = α + β1MONTHVOL + β2E(MONTHVOL) + β3(∆MC|∆MC>0) +
β4(∆MC|∆MC>0)–1 + β5(∆MC|∆MC<0) + β6(∆MC|∆MC<0)–1 + β7∆TAX  (2)
+ β8∆TAX-1 + β9(∆RP|∆RP>0)–1 + β10(∆RP|∆RP<0)–1 + β11TIME + β12RP-1 +
β13MC-1 + β14TAX-1
By rewriting equation 2 we get an expression for MARGIN, which is the variable of
interest.
MARGIN = α + β1MONTHVOL + β2E(MONTHVOL) + β3(∆MC|∆MC>0) 
+ β4(∆MC|∆MC>0)–1 + β5(∆MC|∆MC<0) + β6(∆MC|∆MC<0)–1 + β7∆TAX   (3)
 + β8∆TAX-1 + β9(∆RP|∆RP>0)–1 + β10(∆RP|∆RP<0)–1 + β11TIME + (β12+1)RP-1 
+ (β13-1)MC-1 + (β14-1)TAX-1
The only forward-looking variables in the regression are the expected changes in
volume of sales. The marginal cost is a random walk, so there is no need to include any
measure of expected change in marginal cost.
Expected instead of actual volume of sales is used to circumvent the potential
simultaneity problem caused by both MARGIN and actual sales being dependent on the
price. This may not be a very serious problem, however, since short-run demand elasticity
is known to be very low. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]7
The regression for estimating the expected volumes sold, E(MONTHVOL), is
shown in Table 2. An adjusted R
2 of 0.88 indicates that most of the variation in volumes
sold is due to changes in demand. Price changes in response to tax changes are known in
advance and are often of a larger magnitude than other price changes. The tax changes
therefore affect demand in the period they occur and in the periods immediately before and
after the tax change. (See the next section for further discussion.) A dummy for tax
changes larger than 15 SEK*100 is included in the regression. Smaller tax changes do not
affect demand, see Table 4 below.5 A linear trend was included in preliminary regressions,
but turned out to be insignificant and did not affect any results.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The results for the regression of equation (3) are shown in Table 3. The first
column shows the OLS regression with MONTHVOL among the independent variables. In
the second column, where the 2SLS regression is shown, MONTHVOL is replaced by
expected monthly volumes obtained from the regression in Table 2. The signs on the
estimated coefficients of RP, MC and TAX are the same as in Borenstein and Shepard and
the magnitude of the estimates are almost the same, but slightly higher in Sweden. TIME is
not included in Borenstein and Shepard’s regressions, since they use a panel with period
dummies.
The estimate of ∆MCt-1 is significantly negative for both positive and negative
changes in MC and the estimate of ∆MCt-1 is significantly positive for negative changes in
MC at the ten percent level. Asplund, Eriksson and Friberg (1997) find that part of the
price adjustment occurs the period after the change in MC. A cost increase will lead to a
falling margin in the current month, since only part of the adjustment takes place
immediately. In the following month, the margin will increase as some of the price
adjustment takes place in this month. This explains the positive sign on ∆MCt-1. The
pattern of the response to marginal cost changes is the same in the United States. An
augmented Dickey – Fuller test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in the
residuals.
                                                          
5 Using a cut of point of 25*100 SEK results in only very small changes in the results. Other alternatives would be to
include the magnitude of tax changes or including all tax changes. The results are not sensitive to which of these
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The variable of interest for testing Haltiwanger and Harrington’s model is
E(MONTHVOL) The punishment of a price war after deviating from an implicit collusive
agreement is harder when E(MONTHVOL) is high. A hard punishment facilitates implicit
collusion, i. e. a high price. The theory would be supported by a significant positive
estimate of the effect of E(MONTHVOL) on MARGIN, but as seen in Table 3, this is not
the case.
The results shown in this section are not sensitive to changes in the specification. A
regression closely following the specification in Asplund, Eriksson and Friberg has also
been estimated, as well as a regression  on real variables. None of the alternative
specifications supports Haltiwanger and Harrington’s model.
4 The response in quantities and margins to tax increases
Tax changes are decided by the Swedish parliament and hence known in advance
by the firms and the consumers. Tax increases induce demand fluctuations since
consumers buy more gasoline immediately before and less immediately after a tax
increase. These changes in demand in connection with tax increases give another
opportunity to study price responses to changes in demand. Table 4 displays deviations
from expected sales for periods around tax increases. Expected sales are obtained from a
regression with season and GDP as independent variables (the same regression as in Table
2 but without TAXINCt-1, TAXINC and TAXINCt+1 among the independent variables). Tax
changes always occur on the first day of the month. Period t is the first month after a tax
increase. The month after a tax increase, sold quantities fall on average 44000 m
3, or about
10%, below what would be expected if there were no tax increase. After the largest tax
increases, the fall is about 25%. In the preceding period (i.e. t-1) and the second period
following a tax increase (i.e. t+1) sales are, on average, increased. There is no clear pattern
for more distant periods. The increase in sold volumes in the period preceding the tax
increase is expected, as gasoline is relatively cheap before the tax increase. The increase in
the second period after the tax increase may be explained by the inventory technology (e.
g. it might take somewhat more than a month for many consumers before they must buy
gasoline for the first time after a tax increase). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]9
The price is always increased by the same amount as the tax increase at the date the
tax change occurs, so there is no change in margins the day the tax increase occurs. Hence,
any change in margin in response to changes in demand surrounding the tax increase must
come through price adjustments before and after the price change. The margin is measured
the fifteenth day of each month. The change in margins as shown in Table 5 is the
difference in margins between the fifteenth day of the present month and fifteenth day of
the preceding month. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
One problem with the interpretation of changes in margins is that substantial tax
increases may change the optimal margin if, for example, demand elasticity changes. This
is probably a minor problem for smaller tax changes. Another problem is that the number
of observations is small.
This said, the responses of margins can be compared with the predictions from
theory. In period t-1 demand will be high during the remaining fifteen days of the month.
Demand falls in the month of a tax increase. The prediction of the theory is that it would be
tempting to cut prices and get a short-run profit since, the short-run profit is higher than
usual in the current period and punishment is less severe as demand is low during the
punishment phase. According to the theory, the margins must fall in t-1, thereby
decreasing the profits from deviating, for collusion to remain sustainable. Demand is
unusually low in period t and expected to increase, so the theory predicts an increase in the
margin by a reasoning analogous to the period t-1. As seen in Table 5, these predictions are
not supported by data, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case. A binomial test for
the sign of changes in margins for period t-1 is insignificant. For period t, the opposite of
what is predicted by the theory, a decrease in margins, is significant at the 10% level. 
5 Conclusions
Our econometrical analysis provided no support for Haltiwanger and Harrington’s
model. Expected increases in demand did not have a significant positive effect on current
margins. Nor did the changes in demand in periods close to tax increases follow the pattern
predicted by theories of demand driven changes in the intensity of competition. We10
conclude by discussing whether this lack of support for theory in the Swedish market can
be explained by some difference between the Swedish and the American gasoline market.
The Swedish and the American market are alike in many respects. Demand follows
a similar pattern and the physical features of the product are the same, e.g. minor physical
differences between brands and low inventory capacity among consumers. Hence, we have
to look at other differences between the markets in order to explain the different price
pattern over the seasonal cycle. The most striking difference is in market structure. In
Sweden, 95 percent of the gasoline is sold by the seven largest firms. In the United States,
the market is much less concentrated with a large fraction of the sales supplied by
independently operated stations. The higher market concentration reduces the number of
customers one firm can get by reducing its price. It also decreases the costs of monitoring
the prices of the competitors. Borenstein and Shepard find their support for the theory
somewhat surprising, given that the American gasoline industry is not the tight oligopoly
setting supposed by the formal theory. The Swedish gasoline market is a typical oligopoly,
but we find no support for the theory in this market. The decision rules derived from
Haltiwanger and Harrington is fairly simple. Monitoring of competitors is easy in the
gasoline market, as the price is publicly announced. When monitoring of competitors is
easy and the number of firms is low, firms may be able to follow more complicated
decision rules. It is not in all markets that theories of varying degree of competition in
different demand states are applicable. If the number of firms is too large, the market will
be close to perfect competition and if the number is too small they will always collude on
the monopoly price. Given the inelastic demand for gasoline, it is obvious that the price is
below the monopoly price, but it seems that there are some other mechanism not modeled
in the models of implicit collusion that keep the price down. One candidate for such a
mechanism is entry deterrence. In the long run it would not be possible to set the short run
monopoly price, as it would induce entry of new firms. The results in this paper suggest
that it is not only the number of firms that is of importance, but also the costs for
monitoring the prices of other firms. 11
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MARGIN   87.30   29.40 7.32  147.76 204
MC 119.95   34.65 66.98  197.30 204
TAX 281.56   97.46 139.2 442 204
RP 488.81 105.69 276  672.8 204
MONTHVOL 448.45   60.16 303 561 204
YEARVOL 5381.18 427.85 4679 5910 204
SEK/USD     6.68    1.17 4.12 9.66 20413
Table 2: Estimation of expected volumes sold
Variable




MAR   60.0**
(7.31)
APR   74.5**
(7.23)








SEP   72.6**
(7.31)
OCT   76.5**
(7.23)
NOV   43.9**
(7.29)













Number of obs 203
Variables starred * and ** indicate significance at the 10% 1% level, respectively.
Standard errors in parenthesis.14
































































Number of obs 200 200
Variables starred * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
Standard errors in parenthesis.15
Table 4: Deviations from expected volume of sales 1000 m
3
Date Tax increase t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
930115 112,4 -6 76 -133 52 16
841215 50 37 53 -143 94 -33
900115 38 15 5 -60 70 -96
801015 25,1 1 62 -113 1 38
880415 25 2 71 -118 72 -6
870715 24 -60 77 -36 -29 -11
960115 15 -2 -16 22 31 -58
960915 11 30 0 -18 28 -17
820415 7,1 -1 34 -33 -10 42
840115 6 27 -7 -7 24
840515 6 34 -21 8 26
910715 4 3 -55 42 -7 -5
940115 3 22 -2 -17 0 37
860115 2 -39 10 18 -8 -36
Average 2 24 -44 23 -8
Table 5: Changes in MARGIN SEK*100
Date Taxchange t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
930115 112,4 -4,9 6,0 -10,9 -12,5 -3,5
841215 50 -3,0 -4,6 -7,4 -8,5 5,0
900115 38 1,2 -1,6 10,2 2,4 1,2
801015 25,1 14,1 -0,5 -9,4 -9,4 7,9
880415 25 -5,6 1,7 -26,5 8,3 5,8
870715 24 -0,9 -0,6 -9,1 1,0 23,8
960115 15 5,5 -7,9 -0,8 2,1 -3,3
960915 11 5,2 -3,6 0,2 -10,4 4,3
820415 7,1 1,5 20,4 -19,2 -20,7 0,4
840115 6 -4,4 6,7 4,3 -39,8
840515 6 -2,0 -1,3 -4,7 1,9
910715 4 7,2 -4,3 -8,5 1,1 -0,1
940115 3 24,6 0,4 -7,6 4,0 6,3
860115 2 15,2 24,5 2,8 16,3 0,1
Average 4,3 2,4 -5,9 -5,0 3,816
Diagram 1: Developement of average  normalized margin and volume
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